A Religious Nation That Tolerates Nonbelief Or A Secular Nation that Tolerates Religion?

In Is Democracy Possible Here?, Ronald Dworkin laments the lack of productive argument in today’s political discourse. By “argument”, he means “the old-fashioned sense in which people who share some common ground in very basic political principles debate about which concrete policies better reflect these shared principles.” Nevertheless, Dworkin suggests that by reframing our ideological differences, we could “actually find shared principles of sufficient substances to make a national political debate possible and profitable.”

Consider Dworkin’s characterization of the debate regarding the appropriate role of religion in public life.

Americans agree on one crucially important principle: our government must be tolerant of all peaceful religious faiths and also of people of no faith. But from what base should our tolerance spring? Should we be a religious nation, collectively committed to the values of faith and worship, but with tolerance for religious minorities including nonbelievers? Or should we be a nation committed to thoroughly secular government but with tolerance and accommodation for people of religious faith? A religious nation that tolerates nonbelief? Or a secular nation that tolerates religion? In practice, a nation might well compromise between these two models, drawing some institutions and rules from each. . . . But the two models reflect contrary principles of political morality, and though we may be forced by practical politics to construct some compromise between them, any serious argument about the place of religion in government and public life must in the end be a debate about these competing ideals.

A tolerant religious society, while not embracing any particular faith, “openly acknowledge[s] and support[s], as official state policy, religion as such; it declares religion to be an important positive force in making people and society better.” Such a nation, therefore, may freely “celebrate[] a generalized monotheism”, refer to God in its pledge of allegiance, and feature “in God we trust” on the face of its currency. While the tolerant religious nation “will not prohibit or penalize the practice of any faith or the practice of none,” it nevertheless publicly declares “that nonbelievers are deeply mistaken.”

A tolerant secular society, on the other hand, “is collectively neutral on the subject of whether there is a god or gods or which religion is best, if any is.” Thus, it could not “tolerate any religious – or antireligious – reference or insinuation in its official ceremonies and statement of policy.” While obviously not discriminating against religious practice, the tolerant secular society “would be wary of state programs that particularly benefit[] religious organizations” and would support the Lemon test for its First Amendment jurisprudence.

Dworkin proceeds to describe how his portrait of these two ideals explains several important modern political debates. He succeeds, to some degree, in explaining the rhetoric surrounding separation of church and state and the Supreme Court’s recent struggles to amend the Lemon test. Ultimately, though, Dworkin fails to appreciate the ubiquitous role that faith plays in the life of the religious personality. In a future post, I hope to demonstrate why Dworkin’s tolerant secular society is impossible if it is to include individuals of faith and why his tolerant religious society is a straw man.

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